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ABSTRACT 
TRENDS IN BRITISH POLITICS 
BRUCE E. CAIN 
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
This paper addresses the question of why parties decline 
in electoral support and examines particularly the recent dealignment 
in Great Britain. The general theme is that dealignment depends on 
the nature of the demands placed upon the parties by the electorate 
and the response of the parties to those demands, An analysis of 
the key issues of the sixties and seventies shows that ther'e were
changes in the agenda of British politics, particularly in the form 
of in.creasingly salient economic problems and the emergence of several
cross-cutting issues like immigration and devolution. It is argued 
that to some extent the intrinsic complexity of these issues and the 
demands they placed upon the parties should be blamed for the dealignment 
of support from the major parties during this period. At the same 
time, there is evidence that the response of the parties to these 
problems also contributed to their current predicament both in the 
sense that self-interested vote maximization led to· voter alienation 
and that the institutionalization of support made adaptation and 
change more difficult. 
TRENDS IN BRITISH PARTY POLITICS 
Bruce E. Cain 
The extent to which support for the Conservative and Labour 
parties had declined by 1974 surprised many social scientists. In 
retrospect, the �ailure to appreciate this dealignment earlier was 
not caused by an absence of evidence in the sixties (Crewe, 1976) . 
Rather, the reason it went unnoticed may have been that social scientists 
were not prepared to find electoral volatility in Great Britain, partly 
because textbooks have long emphasized the stability of the British 
party sy stem, but also because the prevailing theories of elector�l
behavior tend to be more concerned with how parties acquire and maintain 
supporters than with how they lose them, While it might have been 
reasonable a few years ago to expect the post-war party configuration 
to continue indefinitely , events in the seventies have demonstrated 
that insofar as there is a trend in twentieth century British politics, 
it is one of intermittent surge and decline. The crucial question is 
of course why, 
Since the growth or consolidation of political parties tends 
to receive more than its share of scholarly attention, the focus of 
this paper will be·on the causes of electoral· decline, The emphasis 
will be on recent deve�opments in Great Britain, but the points I 
shall make derive from a broader theoretical framework which hopefully 
is relevant to other episodes of electoral volatility in British 
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history. If so, then it should be possible to draw meaningful 
comparisons between the current dealignment and changes in the British 
party system at the turn of the century. 
The central argument will be that partisan dealignment can 
be explained by understanding the- nature of the demands placed upon 
the parties by the electorate and the way in which the parties 
responded to those qemands. Most electoral studies emphasize the 
former on the assumption that when the electorate changes in some 
con.sequential manner, the party system must also change. Yet, whether 
shifts in the electorate alter the party sy stem in some significant 
way depends on the parties' response. To take one example, if, as it 
is sometimes alleged, the enfranchisement of the working elass shifted 
. the distribution of att:..tudes in the British public to the left at the 
turn of the century, or, to use a more recent example, if social 
mobility undermined the class cleavage in the sixties, then the crucial 
questions are why the Liberal party in the first instance and the 
Conservative and Labour parties in the second did not adapt their 
behavior_ accordingly. The point is simply that parties do not always 
(perhaps never) act optimally, and understanding why they do not is 
central to any explanation of electoral volatility. 
This may be especially important when studying political 
sy stems where the entry of new parties is restricted: to borrow 
from Hirschman's terminology, the value of voice within a party 
organization may be inversely related to the opportunity to exit 
(Hirschman, 1970) . Rae has shown that broadly based movements of 
voter protest are less disadvantaged in a proportional representation 
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system then under the single member simple plurality rul� used in 
Great Britain (Rae, 1967) , This suggests that the openness of a party 
both in terms of its ability to incorporate .new groups within the 
existing party structure and its capacity to adapt to change may be 
more crucial in party systems like the British where the option of 
a separate party is less attractive. 
CHANGE AND COMPLEXITY IN THE ELECT9RATE
The first place one might look to understand dealignment is 
within the electorate itself, As voters abandon their traditional 
. 
loyalties, the logical question to ask is what changes in voter concerns 
and attitudes Have caused this behavior, One plausible hypothesis 
is that volatility is a function of attitudinal complexity: that is, 
the probability of successful adaptation will diminish as the preferences 
of the electorate become intrinsically more difficult to satisfy . 
The difficulty of voter de�ands will in turn depend on the rate at 
which they change and the degree to which they cut across established 
party lines. I will consider first the one antl then the other. 
The fact that voter concerns and preferences change in 
itself places a demand upon the parties. Of course, not all 
attitudinal change requires party.response since some attitude shifts are 
actually induced by the parties. For example, opinion on wage control in 
Great Britain seems to have followed the vacillations of party policy, 
In 1967, only 27 percent of Conservative supporters·favored wage controls, 
but by 1974, 79 percent of them.had come to supp,ort their party's 
pay policies, During the same period of time, Labour supporters went 
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from a 68 percent to a 48 percent approval, coinciding with the Labour 
party's opposition to Heath's income policy (Fish and Jackson, 19 ) .  
Hence, it is important to distinguish autonomous from party led change. 
The demand for adaptation stems from the influence of factors other 
than party·-- the state of the world economy, demographic changes, etc. -­
on voter attitudes. Parties play a role in fixing the agenda and 
determining preferences, but their control is partial at best. · 
Shifting attitudes within the electorate increase the demands 
.upon the parties in two senses, First, they heighten the degree of 
uncertainty among politicians about the true distribution of electoral 
preferences. One can imagine that it must have been very hard 
for the Asquithian Liberals to appreciate the extent to which attitudes 
had changed during the coalition years. A Liberal in 1918 might 
reasonably have believed that World War I caused a temporary abandonment 
of cherished · Liberal principles like free trade and pacif icism, and 
that a return to normal peacetime conditions would repopularize these 
ideas, Moreover, the uncertainty of the Asquithians must have been 
exacerbated by the final wave of enfranchisement which introduced a 
large set of voters with.previously untested preferences. Richard Rose 
has shown that parties still make electoral decisions with imperfect 
information often because party regulars prefer to play their own 
hunches rather than accept the more systematic evidence of opinion 
surveys (Rose, 1974) . 
A second and related point is that shifts in the agenda 
or in public opinion will increase the risk to the parties associated 
with different policies. To take a stand on a new issue or to change 
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a position on an old issue involves some chance of a net loss in party 
support. As uncertainty about voter preferences increases, the 
payoffs associated with various alternative strategies becomes less 
clear. A changing electorate is therefore a riskier environment for 
the parties than a stable one. As I shall argue later, this makes 
the attitude of the politician towards risk an important variable 
in determination of how parties respond to electoral change. 
Apart · from the fact of change per se, the difficulty of
electoral demands upon the parties depends on whether these changes 
lead to greater or less complexity in voter preferences. In 
particular, issues will be harder for parties and candidates to deal 
with as they cross-cut traditional party lines. It is important·in 
this regard to.see British parties as coalitions of political groups. 
The Libera1 party in the nineteenth century, for example, was a 
coalition of free traders, nonconformists, pacifists, libertarians 
and radicals. The unity of groups within a party is maintained by 
either the consistency of their attitudes across a set of issues, or 
by the fact that issue disagreements occur over less important or 
unsalient issues. Ty pically , the consistency of issue opinions within 
the party is promoted by common ideological themes. However, numerous 
voting studies have shown that only a minority of voters possess well 
developed ideologies so that parties must often rely on differences 
in issue salience to prevent conflicts within their ranks. This 
tactic -- sometimes called an issue public strategy -- is perhaps 
more commonly associated with American parties, but there is good 
reason to think that British parties also cultivate particular 
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clientele within the electorate. When saliencies are uncorelated, 
the fact that opinions in the party are also inconsistent will matter 
less. Some supporters may not like the party 's policy on X, or would 
not like it if they were aware of it, but the fact that they care 
more about some .other issue Y may cause them to accept the party's 
position on X. Issues will'cross-cut established party lines only 
if they are salient to supporters with divergent opinions. 
Politics at the turn of the century provides an example of 
cross-cutting issues. Trevor Wilson, writing on the demise of the Liberal
party, points out that World War I and its aftermath made salient a set
of issues on which the Liberals were divided -- the peace settlement 
with Germany, fiscal policies, nationalization, etc. -- and made less 
salient traditional LiLeral appeals (Wilson, 1966) . These new issues
divided Liber�l supporters between radical elements willing to side
with the working class, those who wanted to follow Lloyd George into 
coalition with the Conservatives and Asquithian Liberals who chose to
ignore the new issues and stand by old themes. Thus, it was not simply
a changing electorate which made the position of the Liberal party
precarious, but the complexity of the divisions brought on by these
changes.
CHANGE AND COMPLEXITY IN THE BRITISH ELECTORATE SINCE 1950 
What kinds of changes in the preference and concerns of 
the electorate have occurred during the last 25 years in Britain. 
Table 1 shows the responses of a sample of the British public to 
the question "what is the most urgent problem facing the government' 
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today?" The data shows that among the changes that have taken place 
are a decline in importance of foreign affairs from their peak in 
the fifties and early sixties, and the rising salience of economic 
related problems -- prices, labor relations and unemployment. In 
every year since 1963, economic problems together have accounted for 
more than 50 percent of the responses. Certain welfare issues -- health 
education and housing -- remain important throughout this period, and 
several new issues emerged such as · immigration, Ireland, the EEC and 
devolution (although it is revealing that by as late as 1975 devolution 
was not considered a salient problem) . 
What sorts of challenges to the parties did these changes 
present: did the.y lead to a more complex configuration within the 
electorate? Since the traditional alignment in Great Britain has 
been one based on class interest, issues should be more complex as 
they cut across the normal working class-middle class dimension, 
This suggests two testable hypotheses, One is that economic judgments 
cross-cut traditional class divisions and thereby contribute to voter 
volatility. Voters, it could be argued, judge economic policies 
"retrospectively," rewarding the government in times of prosperity 
and punishing it when conditions get worse, regardless of class or 
partisan affiliation. The alternative perspective of economic issues 
is that they are implicit, if not explicit, class issues: that is, since 
economic policies have different short term consequences for various 
sectors of the economy, individuals will use their vote to 
protect themselves from these consequences. Taking the second view, 
one would expect more working class individuals to favor the economic 
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policies of the Labour party over those of the Conservative party and 
vice versa for the middle class. 
More formally, one can state the hypothesis in the following 
manner. If economic issues cross-cut the traditional party alignment, 
then the parameter relating class to economic assessment ought to be 
statistically no different from zero, At the same time, a voter's 
general partisan predisposition might bias his or her assessment of 
the government's economic perform�nce and so must be held constant. 
Since any partisan self-image variable is likely to be simultaneously 
determined by the economic assessment variable, I have identified the 
equation by using the father's partisan identification as an instrument. 
Here too, econbmic assessments will present a more difficult challenge 
as the parameter relating partisan disposition to attitude is no different 
from zero, The test involves regressing the class and partisanship 
variables on the issue responses in order· to examine whether the 
estimated parameters are statistically significant. 
where: I is the issue response 
MC is a dummy for middle class, 
WC is a dummy for working class, 
CONS is a dummy for Conservative partisan. 
LAB is a dummy for Labour partisan. 
LIB is a dummy for Liberal partisan. 
Table 2 shows the results for variables measuring the voter's opinion 
. 
. 
of price and wage controls and assessments of the Conservative 
TABLE 2 
ECONOMIC ISSUES 
A. Evaluation of Conservatives on Prices (1974) 
Dependent Variable MC WC CONS LAB LIB 
Very Well -.005 -.02* .02* -.01 .01 
( .01) (.01) ( ,01) ( .01) ( .01) 
Fairly Well .047 -.10* .13* -.08* .07* 
(. 025) ( .02) ( .02) ( .02) ( .03) 
Not Very Well .004 .025 -.04 -.004 -.058 
(. 027) (. 023) (. 026) (. 024) (. 037) 
Not ·At All Well .025 .105* -.102* .107* -.049 
(. 025) (. 021) (. 024) (. 023) (.035) 
B, Evaluation of Conservatives on Strikes (1974) 
Dependent Variable MC WC CONS LAB LIB 
Very Well -.01 -.OB* .089* -.035* .034 
( .02) ( .02) (. 019) ( .018) (. 027) 
Fairly Well .01 -.06* .089* -.04* .016 
( .023) ( .01) (. 022) ( .02) (. 031) 
Not Very Well -.001 -.007 -.079* .019 .005 
(. 027) (. 023) (. 026) (.024) (,037) 
Not At All Well .017 .167* -.073* .090* -.055 
(. 025) ( .021) (. 024) ( .022) ( .034) 
c. Wage Control (1974) 
Dependent Variable MC we CONS LAB LIB 
Stay Same -.024 -.027 .048 .022 .048 
(. 027) (. 023) (. 026) ( .024) (.0 37) 
Get Tougher .021 -.040* .074* -.025 .078* 
(. 023) (. 020) (.022) (,021) (. 032) 
Ease Off .018 .071* -.071* .058* -.075* 
( .027) (. 023) (. 026) (.024) (.037) 
*Significant at 95 percent level of confidence, 
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government's handling of prices and strikes. In all three cases, 
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there are numerous statistically significant coefficients for class 
and partisanship and all have the anticipated signs. In general, 
it would appear that the middle class is less likely to interpret 
economic issues in terms of class interest than the working class. 
However, the Conservative party cue is very strong in economic 
assessments, particularly in the cases of strikes �nd wage control. 
Clearly, econoinic assessments are not unbiased retrospective judgments 
for a significant segment of the British population. 
One might want to know further whether working class 
Conservatives assess party policies differently from working class 
Labourites or Liberals, or conversely, whether there are differences 
between middle class Liberals, Conservatives or Labourites. This 
involves a test of interactions between the various terms in the 
equation. This was done, but since it reaveled only a very few 
statistically significant parameters, the results are not displayed 
here. The only finding of interest was a weak tendency for middle 
class Liberals to be more favorable disposed toward Labour party 
economic policy and for middle class Liberals to be more favorably 
disposed toward Conservative party economic policy. 
As a basis of comparison for the economic issues, it might 
be useful to examine the same independent variables regressed on some 
classic class issues like nationalization and taxation (see Table 3) . 
Again, the class and' partisanship variables have a significant effect on 
issue attitudes, and, as before, it seems that being middle class 
predicts class attitudes less well than being working class. In 
DeEendent Variable 
A Lot More 
A Few More 
No More 
Denatl. A Few 
De2endent Variable 
Cons. V.M. Better 
Cons. S.W. Better 
Lib. s.w. Better 
Lab. V.M. Better 
V.M. Very Much. 
s.w. Somewhat. 
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TABLE 3 
CLASS ISSUES 
A. Nationalization (1974) 
MC we CONS LIB LAB 
-.025 . 064* -. 042* .018 -. 059* 
(.016) ( .013) (. 015) (.014) ( . 021) 
.009 .071* -.042* .052* . 006 
(. 020) (. 017) (. 020) ( .018) ( . 028) 
.031 -.037 .072* -.008 -. 017 
(.028) (. 024) ( .027) (.025) (. 0 38) 
. 046* -.073* . 079* -.028 .086* 
( . 023) (.019) (. 022) (.020) (.032) 
B. Taxes {1974) 
MC WC CONS LIB LAB 
. 041* -.057* . 103* -.025 .001 
(.019) (. 016) (. 018) (. 017) (. 026) 
. 045* -. 06* .098* -.036 . 092* 
( . 022) (.019) (. 021) ( .020) (.030) 
-.008 .094* -. 044* . 092* -.016 
(.021) (.018) (.020) (.019) (. 029) 
-. 008 .059* -.015 .027* -.004 
(.014) (.012) ( .01 3) (.012) (.019) 
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among party identifiers on each of the issues. In every instance except 
devolution, we observe only the opinions of those who consider the issue 
highly salient since, by the reasoning of the previous argument, 
nonsalient issues pose less of a challenge to the parties. As Table 5 
shows, opinions among both the Conservative .and Labour identifiers 
on both class and economic issues are single peaked and clearly 
distinguishable from the dominant opinion in the other party. 'By 
contrast, opinion on devolution is both more divided within a given 
party and less distinguis�able from the opinions of supporters of th� 
other party, The same would seem to hold true for attitudes on 
immigration, especially for Labour partisans. Opinions on the EEC 
are mor� distinguishable by parties than for devolution and immigration, 
but in the Conservative case attitudes are not single peaked due to 
a split between Powellite anti-marketeers and the leadership pro-market 
position. The conclusion one can draw from this exercise is that 
opinions within the•major parties are more divided on cross-cutting 
issues, 
In general then, the most int�resting and, one suspects, 
difficult electoral challenge for the parties comes from issues like 
devolution, immigration and to a lesser extent the EEC, since they 
appear to cross-cut in varying degrees traditional appeals and labels, 
Economic assessments on the other hand seem to be strongly influenced 
by both class interests and general partisanship. How the parties 
dealt with both the economic and cross-cutting issues will be considered 
next. 
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NATIONALIZATION (1974) 
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THE PARTY RESPONSE 
While there is evidence of change in the concerns and 
preferences of the electorate, a full examination of electoral 
volatility must take into account as well the response of the parties 
to these changes·. To return to the example of the Liberal party at 
the turn of the century, it is possible to identify ways in which the 
party contributed to its.own demise: viz., the unwillingness ta give 
more representation to the working class, the split in its leadership, 
and financial problems. A similar question -- how did the parties 
contribute to their own demise -- can be asked of the recent dealignment. 
To say that a party contributed to its own demise implies 
some standard of optimal behavior. There now exists in political 
science a large body of theoretical work on optimal party strategies. 
The general idea behind them.is that if parties act. to maximize votes, 
they will search for positions on iss�es which will assure at least a
tie, given particular distribution of preferences in the electorate. 
This conception of political competition is analogous to economic 
models of business firms trying to maximize profits. However, just 
as the competitive behavior of self-interested firms may generate 
negative externalities, it is conceivable that volatility is � political
externality generated by self-interested vote maximizing party behavior. 
Thus, the first of two party related hy potheses will be that .volatility 
is partly a consequence of strategies which are rational by the standard 
of Downsian vote maxiniization, but which ultimately contribute to a 
growing dissatisfaction with the parties. 
22 
The Response to Economic Issues 
This point can be seen clearly in the response of the parties 
to econoinic concerns. As it was argued earlier, economic issues often 
involve hard choices about present conditions in order to achieve 
long range goals like prosperity and growth. Decisions to expand the 
economy ot deflate, to cut the budget or provide more social services, 
or to nationalize or allow old industries to die, not only h�ve specific 
economic consequences, but they also have political consequences. The 
vote maximizing party must, therefore, choose its policies in office 
under important electoral constraints. While there are numerous 
examples of how electoral considerations constrain economic choices, 
I will mention just a few. 
(1) Manipulating the Business Cycle to Conform to Election Dates: 
Whatever class differences exist in the electorate towards specific 
economic policies, the party in power is always better off in times 
of expansion and growth. The suggestion that parties use economic 
cycles to their electoral advantage is by no means novel. Butler and 
Kavanaugh in their study of the October election say the following: 
October 1974 saw, once again, an election in which the 
incumbent government had manipulated the economy for 
its own short term political advantage. It is no 
accident that in every election for twenty years, apart 
from the unpremeditated one of February 1974, real wages 
have advanced faster than prices over the months before 
polling days. 
2 3  
While the logic o f  such manipulations is unassailable from the standpoint 
of vote maximization, the externalities generated by such behavior are 
an aggravation of the persistant stop-go cycles of the British economy 
and an increasing cynicism about the motives and intentions of politicians. 
(2) Avoiding Unpopular Economic Measures: Both the Labour 
government under Wilson in 1964-1970 and the Heath government of 
1970-1974 enter�d office with long range plans to achieve export led 
economic growth. In each case, the government discovered that it had 
to make potentially unpopular decisions about taxation, unemployment, 
prices and wages. Apart from the tendency to time unpopular measures 
to follow rather than precede elections, the parties found that policies 
with harsh short term consequences often had to be abandoned entirely. 
Unemployment policy is a classic case in point. The electoral 
consequences of' unemployment above a commonly recognized level (2 percent 
in the sixties) strongly influenced economic choices in Great Britain, 
often at the expense of intended structural reforms of the economy. 
Labour's regional development schemes in the sixties, for example, 
subsidized employment in decaying industries in areas like the 
Clydeside, but at the expense of �ot encouraging workers �o move into 
competitive industries. The renewed interest of the Labour left in 
nationalization was largely motivated by the desire to prevent further 
redundancies. Even the Heath government, which was initially very 
hostile to propping up lame duck industries, had to accept the 
subsidization of Rolls-Royce for fear among other things of the 
unemployment that would result. The economic value of unemployment 
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is a matter beyond the competence and scope of this di�cussion, but 
the important points are that other alternatives were foreclosed very 
early from the agenda largely for electoral reasons, and that arguably 
at least, both the Conservative and Labour governments were led to 
implement policies which conflicted with their long range goal to make 
British industry competitive. 
(3) Protecting the Economic Interests of Party Clients: 
Evidence presented earlier indicated that assessments of the govern­
ment 1 s economic policies are frequently biased by one's class and 
partisan affiliation. The fact that economic issues can be 
interpreted from the perspective of class interests means that 
the parties can use th�se issues to their electoral advantage. An 
important consideration for both the Labour and Conservative parties is 
the need to protect the base or core of their support. An'thony King 
has argued that this was a major reason behind Labour's swing 
to the left during 1970-1974 (Penniman et al, 1974) . One way to 
maintain the core of support is to design economic policies which 
decide the hard choices in favor of one's clients. Thus, the 
Labour government in 1964 and again in 1974 attempted to buy the 
cooperation of the unions with generous social service allowances, 
pensions, and food subsidy increases. Similarly, the Conservatives 
in October 1974 tried to win back the middle class vote with their 
mortgage proposals. More generally, the dispute between SET versus 
VAT, wage versus price control, statutory wage restraints versus 
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voluntary bargains, or higher gifts and income taxes versus greater 
investment allowances, can be traced to differences in ideology and 
the material interests of core clientele. Policies which aim to 
please the core are very popular with the activists. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that many agents reported high enthusiasm 
within the party organizations during the February election (Butler 
and Kavanaugh, 1974: Penniman et al, 1975). On the other hand, there 
are two externalities which can be attributed to policies aimed at 
the core. First, policies which please the faithful may conflict 
with long range plans. Labour's taxation policies provided the 
funds it needed to carry through its welfare plans, but hampered its 
long range goal to stimulate investment and win the confidence of 
the business community. Secondly, the appeal to class interest on 
economic policies may have some feedback effect on relations between 
the unions and management generally. A political party's short term 
electoral interest may be satisfied by distinctively differentiating 
its economic policies from those of the other party on class interest 
terms, but if parties do affect opinions withih the electorate, one 
cost of this strategy may be that it contributes to the general 
prisoner's dilema of mistrust which characterizes industrial relations 
in Great Britain. Finally, policies which appease the faithful may 
reinforce the image that parties are responsive to sectional interests 
primarily. 
The Response to Cross-Cutting Issues 
Cross-cutting issues, it has been argued, are. intrinsically
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more difficult to deal with, but here again one can ask whether the 
parties' response to these issues generated political externalities. 
Since these issues are potentially divisive, it may be true that no 
position on a cross-cutting issue would resolve the question satisfactorily. 
Therefore, the response of the parties has typically been to exclude the 
issue from the agenda, to stifle distinctive choice or to downplay 
the importance of the issue. Immigration in the sixties provid'es a 
good illustration of such behavior by the parties. Strict regulation 
of immigration was· very popular among the working class yet the parties 
were unable to exploit the issue to electoral advantage. The Labour 
party was divided between its socialist principles and racialist 
working class sentiment, and the Conservative party was split between 
a pro-Empire faction who believed that Britain should honor its.
colonial obligations and Powellites, The result was.a tacit collusion 
on the part of both parties to downplay the issue, However noble 
this might have been from a civil rights standpoint, it meant that an 
important issue would have been excluded from public debate had Enoch 
Powell not taken up the cause. Doug Schoen concludes the feeling that 
major parties were unresponsive to the common man's needs was a major 
factor in the success of Powellism (Schoen, 1977), The more recent 
problems of dealing with devolution provide another example of the difficulty 
of turn�ng cross-cutting issues into electoral advantage. For this reason, 
both parties failed to take the devolution seriously until after the 
startling gains of the SNP in the 1974 elections despite signs of 
nationalist unrest in the late sixties and early seventies. To 
return to the more general point, the incentives of self-interested 
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behavior lead the parties to delay and waffle on cross-cutting issues, 
but the externality generated by this behavior is that important issues 
do not get properly represented on the public agenda. 
The Effect of Organizational Demands on Party Strategy 
The hypothesis that volatility is partly an externality
caused by rational vote maximizing behavior seems to have some 
credibility , but a second hypothesis which deserves equal examination 
is that volatility is a consequence of behavior generated by organizational 
demands. The swing of the parties to militancy in 1974, clientelistic 
economic policies and the tendency to avoid potentially divisive issues 
can be attributed to the need to preserve traditional bases of support 
within the electorate. Reinforcing these tendencies is the consideration 
that parties are organizations with internal ince�tives and goals. 
The institutionalization of cooperation between groups within a party 
framework means that certain power relations, behaviors and norms 
become set and, therefore, harder to ch�nge. Moreover, the 
bureaucratization of the party makes it less receptive to new groups 
and ideas, and less likely to give up practices which have succeeded 
in the past. Appeasing the militants, pursuing clientelistic economic 
policies and avoiding divisive issues may thus serve a secondary goal 
apart from maximizing electoral support of appeasing demands from 
within the organization itself, 
More specifically, there are three features of British 
politics which bear directly on the problem of adaptability: the 
openness of the party to new men and ideas, the degree to which 
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vested interests are fixed and the bureaucratization of the party. 
(1) The Openness of the Party to New Men and Ideas: As 
new issues, or new ways of looking at old issues, become more popular, 
adaptability requires either that the politicians in office alter 
their positions accordingly or that new men who change with the times 
rise within party ranks to displace them. Some politicians ?f course 
have shown remarkable flexibility during their careers, but uncertainty, 
risk aversity and even ideological stubborness sometimes cause politicians 
to hold tenaciously to old appeals, This makes replacement within the 
party all the more important.· Thus, the crucial question is how 
easy is entry into the party for new candidates. Austin Ranney has 
argued that the British parties are far more closed in this regard than 
the American.parties (Ranney, 1975) , Where aspiring congressional 
candidates in the U. S. must compete in a primary , the British MP is 
selected by small groups of party members with the approval of central 
party headquarters. Moreover, since candidates do not have to run 
in their home constituencies, the parties can manipulate the assignments 
such that senior members of the party run in safe districts while new 
candidates run in hopeless or marginal seats. The significance of 
this is that the outcome of the election will not affect the career 
of party leaders, permitting the luxury of concern for principles 
or the unity of the party, Once elected, the control of the 
Prime Minister and the cabinet over advancement contributes 
to the socialization of new MP's. Those who attempt to take 
up causes not officially endorsed by the party -- for example, 
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Enoch Powelrs stand on immigration -� find themselves excluded from 
positions of power and in some cases have difficulty getting readopted. 
In short, entry into the party is comparatively restricted, and once 
admitted, there are many incentives for the MP to toe the party line, 
Other institutional factors -- the low salience of the local MP ,  the 
restricted power of the parliamentary committees, and the discipline 
of the parties -- make it very difficult for those with radically 
different viewpoints to find autonomous bases of power from which 
to challenge the party. 
(2) The Role of Vested Interests: As parties institutionalize, 
the groups which originally constituted them establish certain privileges 
and powers. By· the formal incorporation of these powers into the party's 
constitution or by custom, these groups can retain a power disproportionate 
to their representativeness in the population generally. The role of 
trade unions in the Labour party, and to a lesser extent, that of 
business in the Conservative party, exemplifies this well. The 
sponsorship of candidates in safe seats, the inclusion of trade union 
and business groups on policy committees, and formal representation 
on the party executive gives sectional groups important leverage 
within the two major British parties. Hence, the parties not only 
cultivate clients within the electorate generally, but clients tend 
to have a disproportionate power within the party itself. Appeasing 
clients by modifying policy, dispensing budget giveaways, or giving them 
representation on the cabinet serves the dual purpose of activating 
the faithful in the electorate and preventing organizational disquiet, 
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It is not surprising, therefore, that the majority of British voters 
believe that big business and the trade unions exert too much 
influence in politics. The key question may be whether parties which 
institutionalize group privileges can hope to adapt to changing 
electoral demands. 
(3) The Bureaucratization of the Party: The growing 
literature on bureaucracies has demonstrated the difficulty of 
changing the behavior of organizations as they grow and become 
more complex. Organizations tend to develop fixed ways of approaching 
problems (sometimes called standard operating procedures) and to be 
averse to adopting new procedures with uncertain payoffs.· The 
. bureaucratic mentality �s one which avoids unnecessary risk. The 
growth of cent.ral party staff, party agents and paid activists has 
created significant bureaucracies in both parties. While there is 
not a great deal of data on this point, there is some evidence that 
agents and clients have their SOP's which make adaptation by the 
party more difficult. Consider, for example, the practice of 
canvassing. It involves locating the faithful, ignoring the potential 
voters of the opponents (for fear they will be negatively motivated 
to vote) and then knocking up your followers on election day. 
Contacting the faithful and drawing them out to the polls on old 
themes is a safe way of assuring a result similar to those in the 
past, but it gives the party agent little feel for the attitudes of 
the nonfaithful, and makes the agent reluctant to use new issues 
or appeals which might divide the faithful. Coupled with this narrow 
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strategy is a reluctance to rely on modern sampling techniques -- after 
all, the agents do not need the polls to communicate the demands of 
the faithful to them. However, this means that agents and activists 
will be even more uncertain than before of changes in public opinion. 
This narrowness of bureaucratic strategy helps explain the undue 
optimism of the agents and party workers during the February election. 
Tpey had the ideal platforms from which to speak to the loyalists, and 
not surprisingly , they probably found considerable enthusiasm during 
their contacts with the populatipn.
· At the same time, the restrictiveness
of their contacts probably prevented them from anticipating the eventual 
result of this strategy in 1974. 
CONCLUSION 
The sixties and seventies brought changes in the agenda 
of British politics and the preferences of the electorate, particularly 
in the form of increasingly salient economic problems and the emergence 
of several cross-cutting issues like immigration and devolution. To 
some extent these circumstances are to be blamed for the dealignment 
of support from the major parties during this period. Nonetheless, 
one can also argue that the response of the �arties to these problems 
contributed to their current predicament, both in the sense that 
self-interested vote maximization contributed to voter alienation·, 
and that the institutionalization of support made adaptation and 
change more difficult. 
Does this mean that continued dealignment or even realignment 
is inevitable in the future? Not necessarily , since much depends on 
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what problems' the parties will have to face in the future and to what 
extent the parties can overcome institutionalized inertia. The 
advantage that the Conservative and Labour parties have is that the 
electoral system makes entry by certain kinds of minor parties into 
parliament more difficult. This means that for many changes in the 
electorate, the parties can afford to wait for the agency of voice 
within the party to initiate the process of adaptation. Issues· like 
immigration or devolution -- because the electoral system tends to 
.reward concentrated support or because the issues are irrelevant to 
the traditional party division are more difficult for the parties 
to deal with. For these reasons, a realignment, if it were to occur, 
would be more likely along racial or nationalist lines than on the 
basis of economic or general disatisfaction. 
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